Psychological Dynamics: Interviewer Characteristics and Suspect Criminal Disclosure

         When investigators conduct an interview, there are possible factors that can influence a questioned person’s responses. These responses can be influenced by the steps of the interview. These steps are part of the cognitive process and begin with a question asked by investigators, and the persons interpreting the question correctly. The person being interviewed then must retrieve the information from memory and construct an answer. During this process, respondents can form answers, edit the responses for social desirability, or shape responses to what they believe the investigator will find acceptable (Lord, Friday, & Brennan, 2005). These responses can be shaped by many factors. These factors can include the investigators’ sex, race, age, gender, and their perceived personality. A response might also be shaped by political beliefs, sexual behavior, and drug and alcohol abuse that the investigator might suggest or project during the interview (Lord, Friday, & Brennan, 2005). Two theories that criminologists and psychologists believe describe these steps of answer editing are the Social Attribution Theory and the Social Distance Model. Both describe the process of answer editing based on the investigator characteristics.

            The Social Attribution Theory suggests that a respondent may modify their responses to meet the societal norms and expectations they perceive that the investigator has based off observable characteristics (Lord, Friday, & Brennan, 2005). This theory is built on the assumption that the investigator characteristics alone are sufficient to influence the behavior and the responses of those being interviewed (Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar, 1999). For example, an interviewee would be less likely to discuss illegal substance abuse to an investigator who presents observable characteristics that maybe associated with a negative attitude toward drug abuse. The interviewee would withhold or alter their responses to make them more compatible with the perceived investigator’s values (Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar, 1999).

            Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar (1999) conducted a study of interviews and subject effects on cocaine and marijuana use disclosure during questioning. The sample comprised of over 3,000 male juvenile arrestees. The juveniles were asked questions about their drug use, particularly marijuana and cocaine. If the juvenile disclosed that they had used either drug, interviewers then asked additional questions regarding the frequency and the last time of their use of the drug. Immediately following the interview, the juveniles were asked to submit to a urine test to confirm any statements. Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar (1999) found that there was a diminished rate of disclosure that was related to the interviewers’ race; with the less disclosure to interviewers who were African-American. But in regards to marijuana reporting, there existed diminished rates of disclosure. This was attributed and related to the interviewers’ gender; with less disclosure to female interviewers (Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar, 1999). The interviewers’ age also played a role in disclosure during the study. The juveniles of this study were less likely to disclose their drug use, marijuana and cocaine, to older interviewers (Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar, 1999). This study also showed that the participants of this study were reluctant to disclose cocaine use but more willing to disclose marijuana use during questioning. Fendrich, Johnson, Shaligram, & Wislar (1999) showed that the less morally sensitive drug, marijuana, had a higher disclosure rate during questioning than its’ perceived more dangerous drug, cocaine, based on the interviewers characteristics. This study demonstrated that certain observable interviewer characteristics are associated with voluntary drug usage disclosure.

            For law enforcement investigators, this study involving the Social Attribution Theory clearly shows that as soon as an investigator walks into a room to interview a person, the person already makes assumptions of the investigator and their perceived values. So what happens in situations involving morally sensitive topics that are discussed during an interview? Another theory as to how certain information of morally sensitive topics is disclosed to investigators can be attributed to the Social Distance Theory.

 The Social Distance Theory is based on the idea that individuals may be hesitant to disclose personal information on sensitive topics, such as sexual behaviors and domestic violence due to the social stigma of the crime or the lack of connection between the investigator and interviewee. If an interviewee perceives that that an investigator has a negative stigma associated with a crime, the interviewee will be less likely to disclose it because they do not feel connected to the investigator. Perceived values that the investigator presents are interrelated with the level of stigma that an interviewee associates with a piece of information. Criminal behaviors are sensitive topics that are stigmatized and criminalized by mainstream society and by investigators in general (Golub, Johnson, Taylor, & Liberty, 2002). Sensitive behaviors such as drug use, sexual practices, and physical violence all have different levels of stigmas. This model states that a respondents’ willingness to disclose sensitive information depends on the social stigma they associate with it (Lord, Friday, & Brennan, 2005). This perceived stigma is based off the differences between the investigator and the interviewee. People tend to disclose more honestly and in greater detail to investigators whom they feel more emotionally comfortable (Catania, Binson, Canchola, Pollack, Hauck, & Coates, 1996). Interviewees edit their responses to the similarities and differences between themselves and the investigator asking questions. For example, if an investigator walks into a room and immediately tells someone they are questioning for child molestation, “child molesters are disgusting...how could anyone do such things to beautiful children”, the interviewee will probably never disclose any information because of the social stigma associated with the crime combined with the perceived values of the investigator. Investigators should be cognitive of stigmas during questioning. It should be noted that stigmas can also appear in an investigators non-verbal movements and gestures also. Something as simple as the nodding of your head in agreement or the look of disgust while the offender is talking could impact the probability of disclosure.

According to a study done by Goulb et al. (2002), individuals are more willing to disclose marijuana use, which is the least stigmatized of the illegal drugs, than recent use of crack cocaine. Goulb et al. (2002) attributed this finding to the social expectations and perceptions of marijuana usage versus crack cocaine usage. Goulb's (2002) theory has since been supported by other recent similar studies. 

A study by Johnson, Fenrich, Shaligram, Garcy, & Gillespie (2000) measured telephone responses regarding lifetime drug disclosure of 3,714 survey participants in Illinois. This study determined that respondents’ reporting recent drug use is relative to interview situations characterized by very high respondent-interviewer similarity (Johnson, Fenrich, Shaligram, Garcy, & Gillespie, 2000). In other words, the closer the respondents felt to the interviewer, the more likely they are to disclose information. Johnson, Fenrich, Shaligram, Garcy, and Gillespie (2000) found that a person interviewed may react, consciously or not, to interviewers based on stereotypes and misperceptions. This should be an important issue for investigators to remember, since a person being interviewed might hold a bias against the investigator's race. This would make it less likely that the interviewee would form a “bond” with the investigator and disclose any information needed during a confession.

Catania, Binson, Canchola, Pollack, Hauck, and Coates (1996) conducted a study of 2,030 18-49 year old adults and asked them questions on sexual behavior. Participants were allowed to choose if they wanted a female or a male interviewer to disclose information about their sexual behavior. Catania et al. (1996) hypothesized that both males and females given the choice to pick the gender of their interviewer will lead to more personal disclosure of the interviewees, which reinforces the Social Distance Model. This study showed that female respondents choose to disclose personal sexual behavior to women, and were less likely to disclose sexual information to male interviewers. Male respondents choose both men and women interviewers, with a slight majority selecting female interviewers (Catania, Binson, Canchola, Pollack, Hauck, & Coates, 1996). This study showed that by making the respondents feel more in control by selecting the gender of their interviewer, there is a perceived decrease in question threat. This perceived decrease in question threat lead to more voluntary disclosures of answers regarding personal sexual behavior.

For investigators this study has provided very valuable information, especially for investigators working sex crimes. Women who are potential suspects in a sex crime might be more willing to disclose more information or feel more comfortable with a female investigator. Men who are potential suspects in a sex crime might be more comfortable to disclose more information to a male or a female. Based on the results of this study I would urge a male and a female investigator to enter the room initially together and see which one the suspect responds or interacts with. The investigator that the suspect has the most observed or preferred interaction with should be the investigator that is the lead during the interview. It should be noted that investigators should not be insulted if the offender connects with a different investigator than themselves.

Investigators questioning possible suspects during an interview should be aware that everything they project and even who they are can determine the disclosure rate during an interview. Investigators should try to find the person that might best connect with the interviewee to be the lead interviewer in a criminal interview. Age, race, gender, and even perceived investigator values can influence how and how much a person might disclose in an interview. Investigators who are working major crimes like homicides, rapes, and child molestations might have a better success rate of disclosure if they attempt to connect with the interviewee and take the stigma away from the crime in question. By removing indicators of negative social stigma, the criminal act could be psychologically justified by the offender while in the process of disclosure. This process allows the criminal to justify or defend his criminal actions. While removing criminal and social stigmas from certain crimes can psychologically haunt investigators when "getting down on their level", it is a necessary interview tactic within policing that is very successful in obtaining criminal confessions. 

REFERENCES

Catania, J., Binson, D., Canchola, J., Pollack, L., Hauck, W., & Coates, T. (1996). Effects of Interviewer Gender, Interviewer Choice, and Item Wording on Responses to Questions Concerning Sexual Behavior. Public Opinion Quarterly, 60,345-375.

Fendrich, M., Johnson, T., Shaligram, C., & Wislar, J. (1999). The Impact of Interviewer Characteristics on Drug Use Reporting by Male Juvenile Arrestees. Journal of Drug Issues, 29 (1), 37-58.

Johnson, T., Fendrich, M., Shaligram, C., Garcy, A., & Gillespie, S. (2000). An Evaluation of the Effects of Interviewer Characteristics in an RDD Telephone Survey of Drug Use. Journal of Drug Issues, 30, (1), 77-102.

Lord, V., Friday, P., & Brennan, P. (2005). The Effects of Interviewer Characteristics on Arrestees’ Responses to Drug-Related Questions. Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 1(1), 36-55.



Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Recent news reports have brought main-stream attention to AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and one of the current bomb makers, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri. So, what is AQAP and how dangerous is Ibrahim al-Asiri?

The AQAP emerged in January 2009 consisting of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian radicals under the leadership of Amir Masir al-Wahish and Qasim al-Rimi. AQAP's goals are to support the activities of al Qaeda and establish strict Islamic law throughout the world (Bolz, Dubonis, & Schulz, 2012). Collectively, AQAP and Al Qaeda were responsible for the publication called Inspire, an English radical Muslim magazine that provided information on how to construct IEDs and other weapons. The magazine also encouraged radical violent acts and allowed similar-minded individuals to contact each other.

The CIA has described AQAP as a major threat to U.S. security (Bolz et. al., 2012) and they have been known to use explosives, assault weapons, and other small arm weapons. White House counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan has stated that the AQAP is "the most active operational franchise" of al Qaeda outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. The AQAP has gained a reputation for being innovative and very active recently from three major incidents that can be attributed to bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri and other radical Islamists.

Ibrahim al-Asiri was responsible for the construction of a device used by his brother, Abdullah al-Asiri, in the failed assassination attempt of Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef on August 27th, 2009 (Stewart, 2012). Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was in charge of the kingdom's counter-terrorism efforts and was conducting a social appearance during the celebration of Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting. Prince Mohammed bin Nayef also used the appearance to show the media a Saudi man who was a wanted militant from AQAP and was willing to publicly renounce terrorism (Stewart, 2012). The Saudi man, Abdullah al-Asiri, asked to meet the prince in order to repent and then be accepted into the kingdom's amnesty program. Prior to meeting the prince, al-Asiri was screened by security and a metal detector did not pick up any abnormalities. Unbeknownst to the security staff, al-Asiri has inserted 100 grams of pentaerythritol tetranitrate inside his rectum (Stewart, 2012). Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) is a powerful relatively stable high explosive which is part of the same chemical family as nitroglycerin. Once al-Asiri was close to the prince, the device detonated ripping al-Asiri in half and thankfully the prince survived. The prince survived due to the downward blast of the device and al-Asiri's body absorbed most of the impact of the blast (Stewart, 2012). Following this failed assassination attempt Ibrahim al-Asiri then used his creative bomb making capabilities to construct the device used on Northwest Flight 253.

On December 25th, 2009 the AQAP claimed credit for the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 as it approached Detroit. The attempted bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, tried to detonate a 6 inch package of PETN powder sewn into his underwear.   Umar Abdulmutallab attempted to mix the PETN and liquid acid with triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a high explosive that was also used by shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001. Thankfully, other passengers noticed foul odours and the flames on Umar's pant legs and subdued him and extinguished the fire before his attack was carried out. After arrest, Umar Abdulmutallab advised that he obtained the device in Yemen and he was directed by al Qaeda to carry out the attack.

The third device that al-Asiri has been considered responsible for is the attempted attack against two U.S. cargo aircraft in October 2010. The two devices were located aboard UPS and FedEx planes addressed to synagogues in Chicago, but counter-terrorism experts believe the devices were intended to blow up the planes once over the United States. The devices consisted of PETN and were hidden inside printer cartridges. The printer itself contained an electrical switch that was connected to a mobile phone SIM card (Stewart, 2012).

Although Ibrahim al-Asiri devices have not been successfully in destroying their intended targets, his innovative and out-of-the-box thinking regarding bomb designs pose a great threat to America and other allies. In previous designs, al-Asiri demonstrated that he is able to create devices that potentially can pass undetected by security screening personnel. This possesses a great hazard particularly to airlines because they are vulnerable; and terrorist attacks generate a large causality rate and extensive press coverage. Until his apprehension, Ibrahim al-Asiri poses a great terrorist threat since his devices are becoming more and more difficult to detect. Tragically, recent media reports have speculated that AQAP may use pets and humans as containers for surgically implanted explosives in the future. With bomb makers like Ibrahim al-Asiri working for the AQAP, I am afraid in time the media reports might actually become true.

References

Bolz, F., Dudonis, K. & Schulz, D. (2012). The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques-4th Ed. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Stewart, S. (2012). AQAP: Paradigm Shifts and Lessons Learned. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090902_aqap_paradigm_shifts_and_lessons_learned on 05/12/12.

The Early History of Terrorism

As a counter-terrorism instructor, students often inquire about the early history of terrorism and the influence religion/politics have on certain terrorist acts. Political science historians and terrorism experts (Pape, 2005; Boltz, Dudonis, & Schulz, 2012) have stated that terrorism has been occurring since the first century with the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii. While the organizational structure of the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii are relatively unknown, their strategic logic is notorious (Pape, 2005). The Zealots and the Sicarii used violent attacks designed to incite an uprising among the Jewish targeting the Roman occupation at the time. After several decades of attacks, the Zealots and Sicarii triggered the Jewish War of 66 A.D.(Aberback & Aberback, 2000). The Jewish War, which resulted in defeat, led to the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem; extermination of Jewish areas in Egypt and Cyprus; and the exodus of Jews from Judea (Aberback & Aberback, 2000). After four years the war ended in Masada, where 960 members committed one of the largest group suicides in history rather than submit to Roman rule after years of war, murder, rape, and slavery.

One of the most well-known historical terrorist groups to date was the Ismaili Assassins. The Ismaili Assassins attempted to overthrow the existing Sunni Muslim order during the Fatimid dynasty, 909 to 1171 A.D. in the Middle East. The Assassins were a small fundamentalist religious sect that believed that they were more true to Islam than the Shiites and the more dominant Sunni Muslims. They engaged in acts of murder for their political goals and frequently used the threat of suicide attacks to compel Sunni rulers to abandon military campaigns against them (Pape, 2005). Besides their reputation for violent attacks, the Assassins were also accredited with the invention of chain –mail armor to protect themselves from dagger attacks (Boltz et al., 2012).

Although the Ismaili Assassins have been labeled one of the most notorious groups of historical terrorists, there has been many more. In previous posts, the definition for terrorism and the acts of suicide terrorism have been explored. Often, suicide terrorist acts have been primarily motivated due to religious or political beliefs. In the 1980’s the Shia Muslims battled the Israeli (Jewish) and Western (Christian) opponents in Lebanon (Pape, 2005). In Sri Lanka, the Tamils (Hindu) battled the Sinhalese (Buddhist) in the 80’s and 90’s. The Tamil Tigers, as they are frequently called, have been attributed to mass usage of suicide bombers to commit murder for political ends. Often women have been used as a suicide bombers, since they arouse little suspicion from their intended targets prior to detonation.

While acts of terrorism did not end in the 1990’s, this brief history should show that terrorism in general has been around since the writing of the Bible. In counter-terrorism circles, often there are theories and strategies to combat terrorism but in reality terrorism will be something that will never be stopped. As history has shown, terrorism is constantly evolving in ideology but some methods and acts of terrorism will never change.

Aberback, M. & Aberback, D. (2000). The Roman-Jewish Wars and Hebrew Cultural Nationalism. New York: St. Martin Press.

Bolz, F. Dudonis, K. & Schulz, D. (2012). The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques-4^th Ed. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Pape, R. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House.

Psychological Variables of False Confessions

False confessions are not a new concept in America, and there have been hundreds of examples of false confessions. In Massachusetts in 1692 many colonists confessed to being witches in Salem. The trials resulted in at least nineteen executions before they were eventually stopped (Agar, 1999). Further along in American history, the Lindbergh kidnapping and murder became a public media skeptical in 1932. During that time, over 200 innocent people came forward and confessed to the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh’s child (Agar, 1999). More currently with the advancement of DNA techniques, confessed sentenced criminals are being released from prison for crimes they never committed. Why would anyone ever confess to a crime, especially a serious one, when they never committed the crime? Current criminal justice professionals, psychologists, and sociologists argue that the suspect’s mental and psychological condition may affect many false confessions. Suspect psychological characteristics, type of crime, and contextual characteristics of the interrogations can affect a suspect’s tendency to confess (Gudjonsson, 2003).

Gudjonsson (2003) discussed different psychological variables that effect confessions. These include current mental status, intellectual functioning, reading ability, interrogative suggestibility, state and trait anxiety, and the understanding of rights by questioned suspects (Gudjonsson, 2003). For these variables to be properly examined, investigators conducting a criminal interview must determine if the suspect is fit to be interviewed. Investigators must assess the cognition and intellect of the suspect to be best of their abilities. The investigators tasked with interviewing a suspect should be aware of any psychiatric disorder that will usually lead to unfitness for an interview and psychiatric disorders that might indicate a significant risk of unreliability (Rix, 1997).

 Psychiatric disorders that will usually lead to unfitness for interviews would be suspects that are experiencing acute organic reactions (including alcohol or drug withdrawals), mania, severe dementia, and severe mental handicap (Rix, 1997). Psychiatric disorders that may indicate a significant risk of unreliability would be milder forms of dementia, hypomania, schizophrenia, depressive disorders, mild or moderate mental handicap, and mild substance withdrawal states (Rix, 1997). While certain psychological disorders automatically should rule a suspect unfit for an interview; the theories of false confessions are endless and are currently being studied by criminal justice professionals.

The mental status of a suspect should always be considered when determining if and how a suspect should be interviewed. Individuals with diagnosed mental handicaps comprise of one to two percent of the general population, but in prison they comprise of approximately 4.2 percent (O’Connell, Garmoe, & Goldstein, 2005). Current studies have determined that individuals with diagnosed mental handicaps are often more easily caught by police and are more likely to be tricked by police during interview into confessing or taking the blame for criminal offenses (O’Connell, Garmoe, & Goldstein, 2005). Suspects who suffer from mental handicaps, even in mild cases, should at all costs understand their rights and understand what is happening to them. For example, if a suspect suffers from Down syndrome investigators should make sure that the suspect has proper representation and is aware of what is transpiring. A person with Down syndrome, if being interviewed, may not understand what certain questions are or what they are being accused of. Personally, I would never ask a suspect who has Down syndrome any questions until they have proper legal representation to represent them. I would also contact my district attorney to see if there is any way to conduct an intellectual assessment of the suspect prior to taking any voluntary statements. A person who lacks intellectual reasoning or articulation skills should never be held to statements that they do not understand or comprehend.

Another mental status that is currently being studied are individuals with ADHD. A study by Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Newton, and Elinarsson (2008) studied 90 Icelandic prisoners who were currently serving prison sentences and diagnosed with ADHD. The study determined reasons why ADHD prisoners made false confessions for previous crimes that they did not commit. The reasons were: nine (43%) wanted to leave the police station or to avoid custody and six (29%) were protecting someone else (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Newton, and Elinarsson 2008). This study concluded that ADHD suspects are particularly vulnerable during police questioning and detention because of their restlessness, poor concentration, and impulsiveness (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Newton, and Elinarsson 2008). The findings of this study are not unexpected, as anyone with any experience with ADHD can understand. Besides certain mental status conditions another issue in confession is the understanding of legal rights during questioning and detention.

Understanding legal rights is another major psychological variable in confessions. It is estimated that 695,000 mentally disordered offenders are arrested and Mirandized annually in the Unites States (Rogers, Harrison, Hazelwood, & Sewell, 2007). Miranda v. Arizona (1966) established procedural safeguards to protect suspects in interviews to avoid making self-incriminating statements and to have an attorney present during questioning. The suspect must make a confession “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). A study conducted by O’Connell, Garmoe, and Goldstein (2005) determined that individuals with lower IQ scores had a higher tendency to be tricked by leading questions. The same study determined that individuals with mild mental retardation demonstrated difficultly understanding Miranda rights. If a suspect cannot understand their legal rights, then their rights can be violated—making any voluntary confession not admissible.  

Representation should always be present and if applicable a psychologist who specialized in the disorder should also be present to explain the suspect’s rights. In situations where the suspect suffers from ADHD, investigators should be trained in how to interview individuals with the condition and every effort should be made to make the interview short and brief. Personal statements from individuals affected by these conditions should not be discredited, since they may be telling the truth in a voluntary confession.

References

Agar, J. (1999). “The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony”. The Army Lawyer; Aug. pp. 26-43.

Gudjonsson, G. (2003). The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions. Wiley, England, 2003.

Gudjonsson, G., Sigurdsson, J., Bragason, O., Newton, A., & Elinarsson, E. (2008).

“Interrogative suggestibility, compliance and false confessions among prisoners and their relationship with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms”. Psychological Medicine (2008), 38, pp. 1037-1044.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

O’Connell, M., Garmoe, W., & Goldstein, N. (2005). “Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation and the Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility”. Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2005.

Rix, K. (1997). “Fit to be interviewed by the police?”. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, vol. 3, pp. 33-40.

Rogers, R., Harrison, K., Hazelwood, L., & Sewell, K. (2007). “Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally Disordered Defendants”. Law of Human Behavior, Vol. 31: pp. 401-418.

Analysis of Reid & McDonald Interview Techniques in American Law Enforcement

Current television shows portray a police interview as a session where the suspect, when confronted with evidence, breaks down and confesses to a crime in a matter of minutes. In reality, this is a product of pure fiction. In most criminal cases, very rarely does the investigator have all the incriminating evidence of a suspect’s guilt prior to an interview. Due to the lack of certain evidence, an interview may be conducted in an effort to obtain evidence that would be needed to affect an arrest and/or a conviction. The proper way to conduct an interview has been examined; and theories and techniques have been formed on which is the most effective way to get a guilt party to confess. Many investigators in law enforcement have their own style and personal techniques while conducting an interview. Most investigators use several different techniques during interviews. While all of the major techniques have pros and cons, I believe the Reid technique is more applicable to the American criminal justice system. Unlike the Reid technique, the interview tactic that I seriously disagree with would be the McDonald tactic.

The Reid technique, when used properly, satisfies two major criteria in interviews. For any technique to be effective enough it must persuade a guilty suspect to tell the truth but not so powerful that it would cause an innocent person to confess (Jayne & Buckley, 2004). The Reid technique attempts to reduce the perceived consequences of telling the truth without having the investigator offer a promise of leniency for a confession. Instinctively, criminal suspects’ deception is motivated to avoid the consequences of telling the truth (Jayne & Buckley, 2004). The consequences that a suspect may face could include jail time, separation from family, paying fines, and other real consequences. The suspect may also feel personal consequences like embarrassment and shame (Jayne & Buckley, 2004). Investigators who are educated on the Reid technique are aware of this and can alter their approach during an interview. For example, an investigator should never tell a suspect “you messed up big time, you will get at least 20 years for what you have done”. If a suspect is fearful of jail and a lengthy sentence, why would he tell the investigator anything?  Instinctively, human beings typically only do things to benefit themselves or others. I have found it usefully to try to relate to the suspect and why he would commit a certain crime, just as the Reid technique describes. The Reid technique encourages the reinforcement of the guilty suspect’s own justification for his crime (Jayne & Buckley, 2004). A focus on the suspects' "victim mentality" might encourage the suspect to confess even though there is no logical justification for committing the crime.

The Reid technique is further broken into 9 steps of interview. These include direct positive confrontation, theme development, stopping details, overcoming objections, getting the suspect’s attention; the suspect quiets and listens, alternatives, bringing the suspect into the conversation, and the confession. Step one, direct positive confrontation, would include presenting evidence to the suspect and telling the suspect they are involved in a crime (Zulawski & Wicklander, 1998). The behavior of the suspect should be studied and this is the beginning stage to any interview. The second step, theme development, would include providing justifications for the suspect to commit a crime (Gudjonsson, 2003). Just as mentioned earlier, this is relating to the suspect and his state of mind during the commission of the suspected crime. The third step involves the suspect quitting denials which could indicate probable guilt, followed by the fourth step of overcoming objections (Gudjonsson, 2003). The fifth step of getting the suspect’s attention is a very important step. This involves physical closeness and the use of verbal techniques to command attention (Zulawski & Wicklander, 1998). For example, if a suspect is showing signs that they are not listening the investigator may turn and face the suspect closer and attempt to make eye contact. This process involves removing any barriers between the suspect and the investigator, like a table in the interview room. By presenting open nonverbal gestures, the investigator might open up a dialog with the suspect. The sixth step is when the suspect quiets and listens, usually showing signs of surrender (Zulawski & Wicklander, 1998). Step seven is alternatives followed by step eight of bringing the suspect into the conversation. This step involves encouraging the suspect to freely talk about any aspect of the crime (Zulawski & Wicklander, 1998). The final step is the confession. At this point the verbal statements of the suspect are usually recorded (Zulawski & Wicklander, 1998).
Unlike the Reid technique, the McDonald tactic involves violating suspects’ rights during interviews. McDonald states that the simplest method to break people is to severely limit their food intake or refuse them food (Gudjonsson, 2003). I believe that this technique is illegal and violates the rights of the accused. From my experience, I have learned that a $5 meal and showing acts of kindness go farther than intentionally starving a suspect during an interview. By opening the interview with some humanity, the suspect might open up to you and trust might be established. This earned trust can be used to the investigators advantage, if the investigator is skilled at interviews.

While the Reid technique has survived legal scrutiny for more than 50 years in the United States, it also must adhere to judicial decisions. This involves legal rights that a suspect has and the advisement at the proper times of the Miranda rights. This is why the McDonald tactics should never be practiced. The McDonald tactics involve borderline torture techniques that should never be practiced in the criminal justice system.

While each human is different and their behaviors are different, each investigator should take these considerations into play when conducting an interview. Over time, skilled investigators use several different techniques to obtain a confession. While opponents of the Reid technique argue that it is unfair, it is still a very effective tool for investigators. It should be noted that some guilty suspects will confess within 5 minutes and some will never confess. Every suspect should be interviewed according to what the lead investigators believe is the best personal method. Textbook methods although are descriptive and great, are not always applicable under every circumstances. 

References

Gudjonsson, G. (2003). The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions. Wiley, England, 2003.

Jayne, B. & Buckley, J. (2004). The Reid Technique of Interrogation. Retrieved from http://www.reid.com/educational_info/canada.html on 07/07/2010.

Zulawski, D. & Wicklander, D. (1998). Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation. CRC Press, Ann Arbor, 1998.

Torture and "Ticking Bomb" Scenarios

            Between 1994 and 1995 authorities received information that Ramzi Yousef, who was being interrogated in the Philippines, planned to blow up a dozen jumbo jets over the Pacific Ocean. Ramzi Yousef was one of the masterminds of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Philippine authorities were able to foil Yousef’s plan after they tortured the terrorist for sixty-seven days (Guiora & Page, 2006). By foiling the bombings of a dozen jumbo jets, the Philippine authorities saved several hundred lives before the act was carried out by a terrorist. This scenario is a perfect example of a “ticking bomb” situation. A “ticking bomb” scenario involves an uncooperative terrorist, like an al-Qaeda or Taliban captive, who refuses to produce information about an imminent chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. After all methods of interrogation have not been successful, is it o.k. to torture the captive? National polls have shown that some Americans support torture in some situations, though the majority still opposes torture itself (Allhoff, 2003). If you believe that torture is not morally acceptable and is wrong, consider this “ticking bomb” scenario in Italy.  In 1978 an ultra-left Red Brigade commandos kidnapped former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, the head of the ruling Christian Democratic party, after killing his bodyguard (Andersen, 2002). An Italian police officer suggested to General Carlos Alberto Della Chiesa that a detainee who had vital information should be tortured to save the former prime minister’s life. General Carlos Alberto Della Chiesa was the individual who was in charge of the investigation. General Della Chiesa who was later killed by the Sicilian Mafia, stated “Italy can permit itself to lose Aldo Moro, what it cannot allow is the practice of torture” (Anderson, 2002). Former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was eventually killed by his captives 54 days after he was kidnapped even though a prisoner in government custody had all the information to save a man’s life and arrest members of a terrorist organization. This scenario shows that regardless of the political or moral stance on torture, people still lose their lives. We will examine the legality of torture or lack thereof and history of torture in the United States. The philosophic theories of torture will also be examined.

            Torture, for some countries, is a common approach to obtaining information from captive prisoners. Saddam Hussein’s former country of Iraq practices cruel torture techniques such as cutting out peoples tongues, gouging out eyes, lopping off limbs, stringing people up with piano wire, and executing people by the tens of thousands among other methods (Hooks & Mosher, 2005). The countries of Jordon, Egypt, and Morocco are well-known for inflicting brutal treatment on not only on suspected terrorists, but against political dissidents as well. While torture is an old and common practice to obtain information in other countries, some people incorrectly assume that it is a relatively new practice in the United States.

            From the beginnings of this country to today’s current “War on Terror”, torture has been documented even though torture violates U.S. Code and the Geneva Conventions throughout history. The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, a category that includes torture. U.S. law under 18 U.S.C 2340-2340A states that there are no exceptions that would allow for the use of torture (Guiora & Page, 2006). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits the use of torture in any circumstances without actually defining what constitutes torture (Guiora & Page, 2006). So, why does the United States still commit acts of torture? This is partially due to the Landau Commission in 1984, also known as a National Committee of Inquiry, which concluded that controlled moderate physical duress could be allowed in “ticking bomb” situations (Guiora & Page, 2006). The Commission found that certain interrogation methods were legal. This included wall standing, the playing of loud music, sleep deprivation, physical discomfort through manipulation of room temperatures, sitting in an uncomfortable position, and the wearing of a hood. Furthermore, in a “ticking bomb” situation the detainee could be violently shaken (Guiora & Page, 2006). Eventually, a series of court rulings stated that certain actions were acceptable while others were not in “ticking bomb” situations.

During the Reagan Administration, the U.S. relied on the court ruling in Ireland v. United Kingdom that found that torture is limited to “extreme, deliberate, and unusually cruel practices” (Guiora & Page, 2006). This set an international judicial precedent that actions including wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink were inhuman and degrading; but these do not amount to torture (Guiora & Page, 2006). Therefore, U.S. authorities used such methods that would not violate law, since certain actions do not constitute as torture.

The balance of legitimate national security interests of the United States and the civil liberties of the individual came to a head on September 11^th, 2001. President Bush and his administration, after the largest terroristic acts on U.S. soil and in our history, dealt with the issue between intelligence and interrogation and whether the confluence of the two must necessarily lead to torture (Guiora & Page, 2006). The Bush administration was confronted with legal and moral dilemmas regarding the limits of counter-terrorism. A memo written by LTC Jerald Pfifer on October 11, 2001 specified which interrogation techniques may be used against detainees held in Abu Ghraid and Guantanamo Bay that were holding suspected terrorist responsible for the 9-11 attacks (Guiora & Page, 2006). These techniques included using scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or painful consequences are imminent for the detainee and their family, the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation, and “water-boarding”. “Water-boarding” is the strapping down of a detainee to a board or held down to induce the sensation of drowning as either water is repeatedly poured down the individual’s throat or the head is immersed in water (Guiora & Page, 2006). Another memo that affected the counter-terrorism torture debate post-September 11^th was a memo drafted by then Assistant Attorney General (now Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge) Jay Bybee.  According to the Bybee memo, for an act to be defined as torture the interrogator must have intended to cause the detainee prolonged harm for a number of months or years (Guiora & Page, 2006). These memos lead to the events that transpired at Abu Ghraid, Guantanamo Bay, Bagram, and additional secret facilities. The events that transpired have led others in the international community to assume the American government endorses and therefore encourages torture.

A report in 2004 conducted an investigation after the Abu Ghraib abuses were highly publicized. The Fay-Jones report identified 44 instances or events of detainee abuse committed by Military Police, Military Intelligence soldiers, and civilian contractors at Abu Ghirab prison. Some of the found actions included the following:

a.       Contests between army dog handlers to see who could make the detainees urinate or defecate in the presence of dogs;

b.      Three detainees were stripped, handcuffed together nude, forced to lay on the ground, forced to lie on each other and stimulate sex while being photographed;

c.       The rape of a female detainee and the rape of a 15-18 year-old male detainee;

d.      A detainee being forced to bark like a dog and crawl on his stomach while MP’s spat and urinated on him;

e.       Several instances of detainees being forced to wear woman’s underwear, often on their heads;

f.       A detainee who was beaten with a broom and had a chemical light broken and poured over his body. MP’s then used the broom to sodomize the detainee while two female MP’s hit him, threw a ball at his genitals and took photographs (Hooks & Mosher, 2005).

           These actions lead to the dishonorable discharge of Pvt. Charles Graner, Pfc. Lynndie England, Spc. Sabrina Harman, and others (Guirra & Page, 2006). While lower ranking members working at Abu Ghraid detention center were sentenced and found guilty of their crimes, higher ranking members received no criminal sentences. President Bush further stated during media reports that these actions were the results of “bad apples” and not due to official memos sent from higher commanders. I personally did not believe that these low ranking soldiers acted alone, I believe their behavior was seen by supervisors and nothing was done to stop it. Interestingly enough, the same report in Abu Ghraid offenses states that 90 percent of the detainees were arrested by mistake; even though this cannot be confirmed because of national security issues and lack of media disclosures (Hooks & Mosher, 2005).

            While the detainees were not arrested for minor traffic violations and their accused offenses are murderous crimes, does this make torture permissible? Prominent public figures have defended and excused the abuse and torture at Abu Ghraid, although they are illegal acts. It can be argued that individuals forfeit whatever rights that might protect them against torture once they engage in certain activities, such as terrorism. If this philosophical argument is true, then torture technically does not violate rights. Assume that a captive has knowledge that could prevent the deaths of innocent lives, like those in the “ticking bomb” situations described above. If a captive is not tortured and the information is not obtained, then the rights of the innocent lives has just been violated. If you torture or not torture prisoners in a “ticking bomb” situation someone’s rights will be violated. Therefore, I am personally unsure if torture can ever be justified, so long as we find ourselves in such a quandary that rights will end up being broken whether torture occurs or not.             

REFERENCES

Allhoff, F. (2003). Terrorism and Torture. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17, (1), 105-118.

Andersen, M. (2002). Is Torture an Option In War on Terror?. Insight on the News, 18, (22), 21-23.

Guiora, A. & Page, E. (2006). The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 37, (2/3), 427-447.

Hooks, G. & Mosher, C. (2005). Outrages Against Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuse and Torture in the War on Terror. Social Forces, 83, (4), 1627-1646.

"Terrorism"---How Should It Be Defined?

"Terrorism" is surrounded by terminological confusion in criminology because there is no clear definition of the term. Terrorism lacks a universal coherent definition and is frequently used in propagandist terms. A large part of the definitional problems of the term are the large range of competing definitions. Criminologists argue that without a clear definition, terminological confusion that exists could effect how to properly respond to terrorism. The definitional problems that exists are the wide range of competing definitions, literal inappropriateness of the term itself, definition by identity of the target and act, definition through reference to the identity of the perpetrator, and the problem of related phenomena to acts of terrorism (English, 2009).

Some criminologists argue that terrorism is a political act committed by a member of a foreign culture for religious or political causes.This notion completely discounts any acts of terrorism committed by "home-grown" terrorists. A perfect example of this would be the bombing in Oklahoma City. The bomber, Timothy McVeigh, was a U.S. citizen who served in the U.S. Army who detonated a truck bomb seeking revenge for the government's actions in the Waco Siege. McVeigh was a militia movement sympathizer and committed an act of terrorism without being a member of a foreign terrorist organization or a foreign culture.

The best literary definition I have seen for terrorism can be attributed to Robert English. It should be noted that Dr. English is a professor of politics, and not criminology. English (2009) states that terrorism involves:
"heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage". 

While no definition of terrorism will ever be perfect, Dr. English has demonstrated that his definition establishes a strong foundation to properly respond to terrorism. Since in order to respond to terrorism, we must be actually able to define it universally.

English, R. (2009) Terrorism: How to Respond. Oxford, New York. Oxford University Press.